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The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) comprised the firsteffort at EU level towards establishing a EuropeanSecurity and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since then,
not only has defence policy cooperation in Europe been
formalised – it has further been given a fully-fledged legal
body in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). Today,
under the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), Chapter 2, section 2 of
the TEU provides the legal framework of the recalibrated
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Lisbon’s
CSDP has involved measures to strengthen the capacity of
European security cooperation by facilitating the cross-
national coordination of defence policy. It has also
addressed the institutional vacuum of the former ESDP.
Yet, the wording of the relevant provisions in the TEU is
modest in providing that the progressive framing of CSDP
towards common defence constitutes a future possibility.
This short article will attempt to demonstrate the
limited development of European defence cooperation
within the auspices of CSDP. It will address two key
questions, first on the degree of commitment to CSDP that
Lisbon generates, and second on the level of integration
achieved indirectly through EU coordination of the
internal market aspects of the Member States’ defence
policy in relation to armaments procurement. It is argued
that although demonstrating a certain degree of progress,
Lisbon’s reforms have not pushed towards an integrationist
approach transforming, therefore, CSDP to an
autonomous operational facility in defence matters. The
Member States’ reticence to cede full authority to the EU
in the field of defence is reflected in the Treaty’s wording
which leaves intact national sovereignty in relation to
military defence. As ever, the EU still relies on Member
States and NATO with regard to all defence capability and
force generation initiatives in post-Lisbon Europe.
DOES THE TREATY OF LISBON ELUDICATE
POINTS OF CONVERGENCE?
The ambiguity and abstract goals of the CSDP
undermine any plans of convergence or defence integration
in the forthcoming future. First and foremost, the Treaty of
Lisbon lacks a literal definition of “defence.” Instead,
Article 42 (2) TEU provides two dimensions to “defence”
encompassing (i) a mandate for the European Council,
acting unanimously, to progressively develop a “common
EU defence policy”, which will lead to (ii) a “common
defence.” The second dimension to “defence” is derivative
of the first because “common defence policy” falls within
EU competence, whilst “common defence” merely
comprises an advanced stage of EU integration dependent
on political will. As such, depending on one’s view, the
CSDP either constitutes an up-and-coming policy
concentrated on relevant gains or remains a work in
progress. But let us see what the terms “common defence
policy” and “common defence” imply.
According to Article 43 TEU, CSDP (“common defence
policy”) covers a wide array of policy areas ranging from
humanitarian and rescue operations to peace-making and
post-conflict stabilisation. Lisbon has also played a
significant part in augmenting the institutional presence of
CSDP by introducing new institutions such as the new post
of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and her CSDP coordinating role under
Article 43 (2) TEU. It has also provided for the
institutionalisation of the European Defence Agency
(EDA) in order to promote greater cooperation in the field
of armaments procurement (Arts 42 (3) and 45 TEU).
Inter alia, Lisbon also contains in Article 42 (7) TEU a
mutual assistance clause which, rather symbolically,
provides that Member States shall assist each other in the
event one of their counterparts is attacked.
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No doubt, these reforms offer more than a hint at
progress. They have established a system of international
cooperation based on voluntariness and consensus but also
one based on flexibility and differentiation. This is manifest
in the flexibility provisions inserted in Lisbon which
provide a small group of Member States with the legal
means for launching enhanced cooperation (Art 20 TEU);
structured cooperation (Arts 42 (6) and 46 TEU, Protocol
10); as well as unilateral implementation of the so-called
Petersberg tasks (Art 44 TEU). Frequent resort to such
novel opportunities may undermine the meaning of
“common” in CSDP by encouraging the advancement of a
two-speed Europe with a hard-core operating beyond the
control of the majority of Member States. What is of bigger
concern to integrationists is the potential of this hard-core
transforming into an avant-garde capable of surviving
altogether outside the EU architecture with its own rules
of conduct and institutions (see T Konstadinides, (2004),
“Now and then: Fischer’s Core Europe in the Aftermath of
the Collapse of December 2003 Constitutional Talks,” vol
11, 1, Irish Journal of European Law 117).
“Common defence”, on the other hand, implies the
transformation of CSDP to an integrative tool. This is
easier said than done, especially since Member States have
made it explicit in Lisbon that “in particular, national
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member
State” (Art 4 (2) TEU). As such, any move towards
“common defence” will have to be made by the 27
Member States acting according to ‘their constitutional
requirements’ as per Article 42 (2) TEU. Despite the
progress made since Maastricht, the Heads of State in
Lisbon remained adamant that state actors still dominate
policy agenda-setting and implementation. Hence, the
rebranding of the ESDP to CSDP and the change from
“European” to “Common” Security and Defence Policy
does not imply any alteration on the predominance of the
state as the central actor in defence policy formulation and
implementation. Neither does Lisbon cast any doubts as to
NATO’s supreme role in European security. The nature of
CSDP remains pretty much an intergovernmental affair
where Member States take decisions by unanimity and the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the limited mandate of CSDP operations.
DOES EU DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
CONSTITUTE A STEP TOWARDS COMMON
DEFENCE?
As briefly discussed, the Treaty of Lisbon does not
generate initiatives that would compromise national
autonomy in military planning (S Blockmans and R Wessel,
(2009), “The European Union and Crisis Management:
Will the Lisbon Treaty make the EU more Effective?”,
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol 14, 2, 265–308, 305).
As such, EU law has concentrated on the place of defence
industries at the centre of CSDP. Yet, despite the
proliferation of EU collaborative procurement initiatives,
there is still way to go for Member States before
transferring any decision-making powers to EU
institutions. This is because defence procurement consists
of a significant part of Member States’ public spending and
a national competence characterised by a complex legal
web regarding the publication of contract notices and
selection criteria towards public contracts covering defence
products. As such, although public procurement in general
falls within the scope of EU law on the prohibition of
barriers to free movement, Member States appear
reluctant to compromise their own preferences when it
comes to defence and therefore include armaments within
the framework of EU law (B Heuninckx, (2008), “Towards
a Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime?
European Defence Agency and European Commission
Initiatives”, Public Procurement Law Review, vol 17, 1, 1–20).
Despite harmonisation of national procurement laws
through EU legislation (see Directive 2009/81/EC and
Directive 2009/43/EC) which implies that defence
procurement contracts with cross-border interests must
comply with EU law, Member States still often resort to a
protectionist approach with reference to national defence
industries. They seem to have found a way to derogate
legitimately from their internal market obligations via
automatic reliance to a Treaty exception regarding the
scope of EU law. This exception is provided by Article 346
TFEU (former Art 296 EC) which stipulates exceptions
for national security reasons in the field of armament
production and trade. EU law shall, therefore, not
preclude the application of the following rules:
(1) The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the
application of the following rules:
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply
information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it
considers necessary for the protection of the essential
interests of its security which are connected with the
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war
material; such measures shall not adversely affect the
conditions of competition in the internal market
regarding products which are not intended for
specifically military purposes.
At first glance this elusive list begs the question of what
kind of measures can suffice as “necessary” for the
protection of national essential security interests
connected with the production of or trade in arm. A
second reading of Article 346 TFEU provokes even more
questions: What falls within or outside the scope of Article
346 TFEU? When is a piece of equipment specifically
intended for military purposes? Being an area under which
European Courts have competence to adjudicate, the
CJEU has clarified matters by emphasising that while
Member States are responsible for determining issues
regarding the preservation of their national security, there
is no general principle excluding procurement matters
from the Treaty’s scope. The CJEU has further established18
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that national practices exempting defence contracts from
the scope of EU law can be in breach of the conditions of
competition in the internal market similarly to measures
regarding products, which are not intended for specifically
military purposes (see for detail the recent CJEU judgment
of June 7, 2012 in Case C615/10 InsTiimi Oy). Despite this
effort by the CJEU to limit the scope of Article 346 TFEU,
it will take time for European judges to establish a list as to
what is regarded “necessary” for the protection of the
Member States’ essential interests in every case the
exception is relied upon by them.
Member States’ freedom to define their own security
priorities and shape the essential interests of their national
defence has been further shaken by the institutionalisation
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) within the legal
framework of the CSDP. The EDA’s role is not to duplicate
existing collaborative armament programmes in Europe
but to support the Council and the Member States towards
improving EU defence capabilities within a voluntary and
non-binding intergovernmental framework. Accordingly,
the general rule is that all public contracts have to be put
out to tender and would be awarded by the EDA on behalf
of the participating Member States. Yet, the EDA has no say
over the Member States’ essential security interests – it
cannot in itself invoke Article 346 TFEU effectively to
derogate from the Treaties’ application. It can only refrain
from complying with the EU procurement framework if
Member States decide to invoke Article 346 TFEU in
relation to EDA procurement programmes. Hence, the
EDA is not yet a defence procurement programme
coordinator. It merely manages projects on behalf of the
Member States and is controlled by them, operating under
the political supervision of the Council and financed by the
Member States (see P Koutrakos, “The Role of Law in
Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions,
Limitations and Perceptions” in P Koutrakos (ed), European
Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar,
2011).
CONCLUSION: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE,
WILL BE DONE AGAIN?
The Treaty of Lisbon has not changed the manner in
which CSDP policy formulation and execution operates.
Policy decisions are still by and large taken unanimously by
the EU Member States. Equally, with reference to the
interaction of security and defence with the internal
market, the Treaty has retained the separation between the
“European” and the “national” despite the CJEU’s
attempts to clear the water vis-à-vis the invocation of
Article 346 TFEU. Despite the rise of EU collaborative
procurement initiatives, in the absence of structured
coordination of national policies, the European armaments
market remains fragmented along national lines.
In conclusion, Lisbon’s legal limitations are illustrative of
the lack of political will to generate concrete cooperative
initiatives that indicate a transition from “defence policy” to
“defence.” Whilst Lisbon has created possibilities for
approximation of national practices in the “softer” aspects of
security, such as the external dimension of Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters, it has fell short of
generating cooperation in areas which carry important
implications for states’ relative power, such as military
structures and capability procurement. As such, the utility of
CSDP as an effective component of the EU’s response to
global threats and a means of facilitating cross-national
coordination of defence policy remains a diamond in the
rough. More research is therefore needed to assess the
implications for the future of European defence cooperation,
preferably by adopting an interdisciplinary approach that
uses the insights of EU law to assess the utility of existing
theoretical accounts of European defence cooperation (see
T Dyson and T Konstadinides, European Defence Cooperation in
EU Law and IR Theory, Palgrave 2013).
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